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I. INTRODUCTION
The lure of the ocean shore is so strong that an estimated 122
million people visit American beaches each year.' Accessing the
coastal shore is not just a preferred pastime of many Americans; it is
a right of all Americans. In every state, the public has some legal
right to access and use the shoreline. The source of the right of access
and the portion of the shoreline that the public has a right to use vary
from state to state. The right and the extent of the right might be
found in a state constitution,2 a state statute,3 or a state court's
interpretation of the Public Trust Doctrine,4 property law,s the
Doctrine of Custom, 6 or some combination of these sources of law.
* Professor Thompson earned his J.D. from Boalt Hall at the University of
California, Berkeley, in 1987. He earned his Ph.D. in Planning from the University
of California, Berkeley, in 1998. He is the Chair of the Department of Marine
Affairs at the University of Rhode Island. His areas of teaching and research
include public access to the ocean shore, coastal hazards and adaptation to climate
change, and the use of geographic information systems to study human uses of the
coastal and marine environment. He would like to thank the editors of Fordham
Environmental Law Review for their hard work and professionalism.
1. NATALIE SPRINGUEL ET AL., ME. SEA GRANT COLLEGE PROGRAM, ACCESS
TO THE WATERFRONT: ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS ACROSS THE NATION 4 (2007); see
also TIMOTHY BEATLEY ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT 2 (2d ed. 2002) (putting the number of visitors at 180 million).
2. See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17.
3. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.001(8) (West 2013).
4. See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d
47, 54 (N.J. 1972); Raleigh Ave. Beach Assoc. v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d
112, 117 (N.J. 2005); see also JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA'S COASTS 5-13 (1994); DAVID C.
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Even though the public has a right to access the shore in every
state, local governments have been known to restrict on-street
parking as a means of preventing nonresidents from accessing the
shoreline.7 This article examines two potential legal challenges to the
types of parking restrictions that as a practical matter eliminate beach
SLADE ET AL., COASTAL STATES ORG., INC., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
TO WORK: THE APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE
MANAGEMENT OF LANDS, WATERS, AND LIVING RESOURCES OF THE COASTAL
STATES 15-27 (2d ed. 1997).
5. For cases both recognizing and rejecting attempts to establish a public right
to access and utilize a portion of the shoreline through either prescriptive easement
or implied dedication, see JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 318-
34 (3d ed. 2007).
6. See State ex rel. Thornton v. Hays, 462 P.2d 671, 677-78 (Or. 1969)
(concluding that the use of the sandy shoreline by the general public could be
traced back to the original settlers and the Native Americans and, therefore, the
right to access and use was established by the common law doctrine of customary
rights); see also Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 903
P.2d 1246, 1272 (Haw. 1995) (holding that traditional and customary rights of
native Hawaiians could be practiced on public and private land that was either
undeveloped or less than fully developed). See generally Michael C. Blumm &
Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as
Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005), for a
discussion of cases where courts have found that a customary property right
militates against a takings claim based upon Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992).
7. Marc R. Poirier, Beach Access, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW ENGLAND:
THE CULTURE AND HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN REGION 906, 907 (Burt Feintuch &
David H. Watters eds., 2005) [hereinafter Poirier, Beach Access]; see also Marc R.
Poirier, Environmental Justice and the Beach Access Movements of the 1970s in
Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L.
REV. 719, 775 (1996) (discussing thoroughly New Jersey and Connecticut beach
access conflicts, particularly with reference to civil rights) [hereinafter Poirier,
Environmental Justice]; Robert Garcia & Erica Flores Baltodano, Free the Beach!
Public Access, Equal Justice, and the California Coast, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 143
(2005) (discussing attempts by local communities to prohibit outsiders from
accessing local beaches in Southern California); Robert Thompson & Tracy
Dalton, Measuring Public Access to the Shoreline: The Boat-Based Offset Survey
Method, 38 COASTAL MGMT. 378, 390-91 (2010) (describing a statistical analysis
of the availability of parking and shoreline access); Robert Thompson, Affordable
Twenty-Four Hour Access: Can We Save A Working Stiff's Place in Paradise?, 12
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 91 (2007) (discussing barriers to coastal access based upon
income).
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access for nonresidents. The first argument is that beaches are public
forums and, consequently, parking restrictions that unreasonably
burden access to these forums unconstitutionally infringe upon the
right to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The second argument is that such parking
restrictions prevent a class of persons (i.e., nonresidents) from
gathering on the beach, thereby violating their First Amendment right
to assemble.
Part II.A provides a brief historical overview of the connection
between transportation improvements in the United States and the
growth of visitation to America's ocean shores. The tremendous
growth in visitors to beaches ultimately led to parking restrictions.
Part II.B discusses briefly the source of a municipality's power to
regulate on-street parking and the potential limitations on that power.
Part II.C, then, examines when and why municipalities have been
able to adopt constitutionally sound ordinances giving preferential
on-street parking arrangements to residents. However, Part II.D.1
through Part II.D.8 argue that parking restrictions that seriously limit
access to the ocean shoreline are unconstitutional because beaches
are traditional public forums and parking restrictions that seriously
hinder access to these forums unconstitutionally burdens our First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and to assembly. Lastly, Part
II.D.9 examines whether parking bans near access points to public
beaches are likely to survive freedom of speech and assembly
challenges.
II. DISCUSSION
A. A Short History of a Developing Conflict: From Solitude to the
Masses
When Henry David Thoreau made his four trips to Cape Cod
starting in 1849 and ending in 1857, the shorelines away from the
working waterfronts were largely deserted except when an event like
a shipwreck or the running aground of a pod of blackfish (commonly
known as pilot whales) drew large crowds to the shoreline.8 To get to
a remote shoreline like Cape Cod, Thoreau traveled by stagecoach,
and it was a slow and difficult trip that was only made by residents
8. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, CAPE COD 15-21, 141-45 (W.W. Norton 1951).
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and the adventurous. 9 In the 1700s and most of the 1800s, travel to
parts of the coast beyond the larger coastal towns was greatly
inhibited by a lack of well-maintained roads or railroads.10 However,
with every transportation improvement, larger crowds arrived at the
coast and along with them came more development.11 First ferries
and then a rapidly growing railroad systeml2 created destination
coastal resorts that supported large crowds in places like Old
Orchard, Maine;13 Newport, Oregon;14 Palm Beach, Florida;1
Falmouth, Massachusetts; 16 Newport, Rhode Island; Cape May and
Atlantic City, New Jersey; and Coney Island in New York.1
Still, because railroads and ferries only reached isolated points
along the coast, most of the shoreline remained largely inaccessible
to anyone but the local population. This limitation began to change
rapidly with the expansion of automobile ownership and government
efforts to build and improve roads to spur economic development. At
the beginning of the twentieth century trains ran along about 300,000
miles of set rails.18 By contrast, automobiles had almost 3,000,000
9. Id. at 28-39.
10. See KARL F. NORDSTROM, BEACHES AND DUNES OF DEVELOPED COASTS 8
(2000).
11. See id.; see also CINDY S. ARON, WORKING AT PLAY: A HISTORY OF
VACATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 3-4 (1999); John Davenport & Julia L.
Davenport, The Impact of Tourism and Personal Leisure Transport on Coastal
Environments: A Review, 67 ESTUARINE, COASTAL & SHELF SCI. 280, 280-82
(2006). For the importance of the automobile in transforming coastal tourism, see
LENA LENCEK & GIDEON BOSKER, THE BEACH: THE HISTORY OF PARADISE ON
EARTH 223-27 (1999).
12. Railroad mileage increased from twenty-three miles in 1830 to
approximately 30,000 miles in 1860 and to 166,000 in 1890. See JON STERNGASS,
FIRST RESORTS: PURSUING PLEASURE AT SARATOGA SPRINGS, NEWPORT & CONEY
ISLAND 17 (2001).
13. Roy P. Fairfield, The Old Orchard "Set-Off", 27 NEW ENG. Q. 227, 229-30
(1954).
14. PAUL D. KOMAR, THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST COAST: LIVING WITH THE
SHORES OF OREGON AND WASHINGTON 69 (1998).
15. LENCEK & BOSKER, supra note 11, at 204-05.
16. See generally JAMES C. O'CONNELL, BECOMING CAPE COD: CREATING A
SEASIDE RESORT (2003).
17. STERNGASS, supra note 12, at 17-18, 50-51, 76-82; see also LENCEK &
BOSKER, supra note 11, at 223-27.
18. WARREN JAMES BELASCO, AMERICANS ON THE ROAD: FROM AUTOCAMP TO
MOTEL 1910-1945, at 23 (1979).
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miles of road available to them. 19 Even though many of these miles
were dirt and therefore difficult to traverse, automobile ownership
allowed tourists and summer residents to reach shorelines that were
previously inaccessible and to stay at more dispersed summer
cottages, boardinghouses, and farms rather than traditional resort
hotels.20
Building roads for tourists became an explicit economic
development strategy in coastal areas. For example, on Cape Cod, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts recognized the connection between
roads and tourist dollars, and by 1915 Massachusetts had converted
Thoreau's bumpy stagecoach ride into a comfortable automobile ride
21
on paved and well-marked modern roads. Once the smooth roads
were in place, the tourists and their cars flowed out onto the Cape.
For instance, when the Massachusetts Highway Commission tracked
the traffic in Sandwich at one of the bridges crossing the Cape Cod
Canal on an August day in 1909, fifty-seven horse-drawn vehicles
22
and seventy-five motor vehicles traversed the bridge. There were
twenty-three horse-drawn vehicles and 559 motor vehicles across the
23bridge nine years later. On a Sunday in 1936, state police counted
55,000 automobiles crossing one of the two bridges over the Cape
24Cod Canal. By 1951, "over 200,000 tourists were visiting Cape Cod
at one time, jamming the highways, overnight cabins, and
restaurants."25 Of course, the cars full of tourists have never stopped
coming, and now Cape Cod is notorious for its "mammoth traffic
jams on every summer weekend." 26
19. Id.
20. Id. at 27-28; see also DONA BROWN, INVENTING NEW ENGLAND: REGIONAL
TOURISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 207 (1995).
21. See BROWN, supra note 20, at 208. For a discussion of how the automobile
generally freed American tourists from the negative aspects of large resorts and
railroad travel, see BELASCO, supra note 18, at 19-69.
22. O'CONNELL, supra note 16, at 47.
23. Id.
24. BROWN, supra note 20, at 209.
25. Lewis M. Alexander, The Impact of Tourism on the Economy of Cape Cod,
Massachusetts, 29 EcoN. GEOGRAPHY 320, 323 (1953); see also BROWN, supra
note 20, at 207.
26. BROWN, supra note 20, at 209.
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As visitation to the nation's shorelines increased, so did tensions
with shoreline municipalities and property owners on one side and
visitors on the other:
Throughout the coastal United States, conflicts over shore
use and access intensified during the 1960s and 1970s
because of increased population, changing vacation habits,
the availability of automobiles, the improved interstate
highway system, and increasing permanent suburban or
retirement populations in shore towns.27
In response to the growing crowds, shoreline municipalities began to
take steps to keep "outsiders" off of "their" beaches.28 Because most
of the 122 million people who want to visit the beach live or stay too
far away to walk to it, and because most beaches are not well served
by public transportation (particularly outside urban areas),29 the only
reasonable way for many people to visit many beaches is to drive
there and to park within walking distance of the beach.30
Consequently, a "[s]omewhat more subtle means [than explicitly
restricting access] of keeping beaches for limited populations
include[] reserving the only convenient parking for local
residents . . . ."31 Although a number of writers have noted the fact
that parking restrictions are used to keep people from outside the
immediate area off the beach, the legality of such parking restrictions
remains unsettled.32
27. See Poirier, Beach Access, supra note 7, at 906.
28. See Poirier, Environmental Justice, supra note 7, at 775. See also Garcia &
Baltodano, supra note 7, at 144-45, for a discussion of attempts by local
communities to prohibit outsiders from accessing local beaches in Southern
California.
29. See Garcia & Baltodano, supra note 7, at 150.
30. See Thompson & Dalton, supra note 7, at 389-91 (showing in a study of
access to the shoreline of Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island that there was no
statistical correlation between shoreline access and the density of shoreline access
points or the population density of the surrounding neighborhood, but there was a
strong positive correlation between shoreline access and the available parking).
31. See Poirier, Beach Access, supra note 7, at 907.
32. See, e.g., ARCHER ET AL., supra note 4, at 108 ("Parking restrictions could
also serve as an effective deterrent to beach use. It remains to be seen, however,
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This article examines two potential constitutional challenges to
parking restrictions that as a practical matter eliminate beach access
for nonresidents. First, local parking restrictions that unnecessarily
limit public access to public beaches unconstitutionally burden the
right to free speech because public beaches should be treated as
traditional public forums. Public beaches are analogous to public
parks and often act as public thoroughfares, both of which are
quintessential public forums. Second, such parking restrictions
prevent people outside the neighborhood from gathering on the
public beach, thereby violating their right to assemble. These parking
restrictions, however, are typically the product of municipal
ordinances. Consequently, before discussing the potential legal
challenges to parking restrictions that block access, this article will
briefly discuss the source of a municipality's power to regulate on-
street parking and the potential limitations on that power.
B. Parking and the Police Power
Generally, municipal governments may regulate the time, place
and manner of parking on public streets within their jurisdiction
pursuant to their delegated police power.33 The police power rests
with the state and each state may delegate aspects of the police power
to municipal corporations differently.34 The power to enact
reasonable parking regulations may be explicitly delegated by the
whether parking restrictions that are clearly intended to restrict beach access will
withstand challenge.").
33. See generally 7A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 24:648 (3d ed., rev. vol. 2011); Meekins v. City of New York,
524 F. Supp. 2d 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Homes on Wheels v. City of Santa Barbara,
15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Hofland, 857 A.2d 1271 (N.H.
2004); Allen & Reed, Inc. v. Presbrey, 144 A. 888 (R.I. 1929).
34. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, 154 Cal. Rptr. 374,
377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (citations omitted):
The [state] legislature is possessed of the entire police power of the state,
except as its power is limited by the provisions of the constitution. The
determination as to what portion, if any, of a state's police power shall be
delegated to its lesser political entities is left to its people through
constitutional processes or through their legislatures.
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state35 or it may be implied from their delegated authority to regulate
traffic.36 The common law rule, however, has always been that public
streets are presumed to be open to any member of the public.37
Moreover, the right to travel on a public street or highway includes
the right to park for legitimate purposes that are a normal part of
travel. This right to park cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably
restricted through municipal parking regulations.38 Furthermore, even
though each municipality has a special interest in the traffic and
parking problems on its own streets, it cannot regulate its streets
without regard for neighboring communities and nonresidents
35. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-12-12(a)(1) (2013); see also Levine v. Police
Comm'n of Fairfield, 612 A.2d 787, 795 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992); Associated
Students of the Univ. of Mont. v. City of Missoula, 862 P.2d 380, 382 (Mont.
1993); Younker v. Village of Ossining, 41 A.D.3d 470, 471-72 (N.Y. App. Div.
2007).
36. See Salomone v. City of Canton, 175 N.E.2d 663, 666 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961);
City of Rapid City v. Rensch, 90 N.W.2d 380, 383 (S.D. 1958).
37. See Lafayette, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 376-77 (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted):
Fundamentally it must be recognized that in this country "Highways are
for the use of the traveling public, and all have . . . the right to use them in
a reasonable and proper manner, and subject to proper regulations as to
the manner of use." . . . "The streets of a city belong to the people of the
state, and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen, subject to
legislative control or such reasonable regulations as to the traffic thereon
or the manner of using them as the legislature may deem wise or proper to
adopt and impose" . . . .... Streets and highways are established and
maintained primarily for purposes of travel and transportation by the
public, and uses incidental thereto. Such travel may be for either business
or pleasure . . . . The use of highways for purposes of travel and
transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental
right, of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived ...
[A]ll persons have an equal right to use them for purposes of travel by
proper means, and with due regard for the corresponding rights of others."
See also Citizens Against Gated Enclaves v. Whitley Heights Civic Ass'n, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 451, 454 (1994); People v. Speakerkits, Inc., 633 N.E.2d 1092 (N.Y.
1994) (citing N.Y. State Pub. Emps. Fed'n. v. City of Albany, 527 N.E.2d 253, 255
(N.Y. 1988)) ("[T]he common-law rule [is] that the 'right to use of the highways is
said to rest with the whole people of the State, not with the adjacent proprietors or
the inhabitants of the surrounding municipality."').
38. Salomone, 175 N.E.2d at 665; Triplett v. City of Corbin, 269 S.W.2d 188,
188 (Ky. 1954).
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because traveling on public streets is not solely a municipal affair but
39instead a matter of statewide concern.
Although a municipality can regulate parking in a number of
different ways, this article examines only two types of parking
restrictions: resident only parking zones and complete prohibitions of
on-street parking. Unlike restrictions that limit the amount of time
that someone can park on the street, ordinances that completely
prohibit people from parking within a reasonable walking distance of
a beach access point can, as a practical matter, make the beach
inaccessible for people who live outside the immediate neighborhood
and, therefore, such restrictions should face special scrutiny when
challenged.
C. Preferential Parking for Residents
At first glance, a municipal ordinance that allows residents to park
on certain streets while prohibiting nonresidents from parking on the
same streets might seem to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court, however,
has held that municipal ordinances that create preferential parking for
neighborhood residents can withstand a constitutional challenge.
In County Bd. of Arlington County, Va. v. Richards, the County
adopted a zoning ordinance that was intended to stop people who
were commuting to commercial and industrial districts from parking
in an adjoining residential neighborhood.40 Pursuant to the ordinance,
no one could park in the designated residential areas between 8:00
AM and 5:00 PM on weekdays without a parking permit.41 Permits,
which were free, were only available to residents, to persons doing
42business with residents, and to some visitors. Commuters who had
regularly parked in a newly restricted residential area sued to enjoin
enforcement of the ordinance, in part, as a violation of the Equal
39. Lafayette, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 376 (quoting Exparte Daniels, 192 P. 442, 444
(Cal. 1920): "While it is true that the regulation of traffic upon a public street is of
special interest to the people of a municipality, it does not follow that such
regulation is a municipal affair, and if there is a doubt as to whether or not such
regulation is a municipal affair, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the
legislative authority of the state.")
40. Cnty. Bd. of Arlington Cnty., Va. v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5, 5-6 (1977).
4 1. Id.
42. Id. at 5.
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Protection Clause. While the Virginia Supreme Court ultimately held
that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause, the United
States Supreme Court disagreed. The Arlington Court noted, "[t]he
Equal Protection Clause requires only that the distinction drawn by
an ordinance like Arlington's rationally promote the regulation's
objectives." 43
The goals that the ordinance promoted were to reduce air pollution
from automobile commuting, to provide more convenient parking for
the neighborhood residents, and to enhance the quality of life in the
neighborhood by reducing noise, traffic hazards, and litter. The court
found that the stated goals were legitimate and that the parking
restrictions rationally promoted these goals. Thus, barring
nonresidents from parking on a public street was held to be
- - 44constitutional in this case.
On busy days at the beach, residents living next to or near access
points could certainly have problems similar to those that were
addressed in the Arlington County ordinance. Parking spaces can be
hard to find. Visitors can be noisy as they unload and load their cars.
If garbage and bathroom facilities are inadequate or nonexistent,
visitors might leave their garbage on the street and even urinate in the
bushes.45 Consequently, a municipal ordinance barring nonresidents
from parking near access points would not, on its face, violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. However,
such an ordinance might be challenged in two other ways. First, such
an ordinance might violate the public's right to access a traditional
public forum, thereby violating their First Amendment right to
speech. Second, such an ordinance might violate the public's First
Amendment right to assemble. Under the Equal Protection Clause,
the parking bans only need to be "rationally related to a legitimate
state interest." 46 As will be discussed fully in Part II, if the parking
ban infringes upon First Amendment rights, then the ordinance must
43. Id. at 7.
44. Id. at 7-8.
45. See, e.g., Garcia & Baltodano, supra note 7, at 188; C. Eugene Emery,
Anglers, Residents Spar Over Beach Lot, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 19, 2008.
46. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). See also Fla.
State Conference of NAACP Branches v. City of Daytona Beach, 54 F. Supp. 2d.
1283, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 1999); Curse v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 843 F.2d 456, 463
(11th Cir. 1988).
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be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication." 47
D. Access to the Beach and the Rights to Free Speech and Assembly
1. Free Speech and the Public Forum Doctrine
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states, in
part, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech ... or the right of the people peaceably to assemble." 4 8
Through the doctrine of incorporation, the Supreme Court has used
the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the First Amendment
protections of speech and assembly to the states and hence to
49
municipal governments which exercise delegated state power.
Thus, freedom of speech is among the fundamental rights and
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by state action, and any government
action which chills constitutionally protected speech or expression
contravenes the First Amendment.so
To explain how an on-street parking ban could possibly be an
unconstitutional infringement on the right to free speech, one must
start by examining the importance that the courts have placed on the
character of the place where the speech is being infringed upon.
To ascertain what limits, if any, may be placed on protected
speech, we have often focused on the "place" of that
speech, considering the nature of the forum the speaker
seeks to employ. Our cases have recognized that the
standards by which limitations on speech must be evaluated
"differ depending on the character of the property at issue."
Specifically, we have identified three types of fora: "the
47. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
49. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1928); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 363 (1937).
50. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 465 (1979); Wolford v. Lasater, 78
F.3d 484, 488 (10th Cir. 1996).
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traditional public forum, the public forum created by
government designation, and the nonpublic forum."5 1
The constitutionality of a law that restricts speech can hinge on a
court's characterization of the place where speech is restricted
because the designation will determine the level of scrutiny.
When a regulation restricts the use of government property as a
forum for expression, an initial step in analyzing whether the
regulation is unconstitutional is determining the nature of the
government property involved.52 The nature of the property
determines the level of constitutional scrutiny applied to the
-53restrictions on expression.
Laws that infringe on speech on governmental property that have
been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity or that
has been expressly dedicated to speech activity are examined using
the strict scrutiny standard. If, however, the property is not a
traditional public forum and the government has not dedicated it to
First Amendment activity, the law is examined only for its
reasonableness. 54 "Traditional public forums" are places that by long
tradition have been devoted to assembly and debate; "designated
public forums" or "limited public forums" are a place created by the
government for use by the public at large for assembly and speech,
for use by certain speakers, or for discussion of certain subjects; and
"nonpublic forums" are government properties that are not by
tradition or designation forums for public communication.
To determine whether beaches might indeed be traditional public
forums, one needs to look at what types of places have been held to
be traditional public forums and at the factors that the courts have
looked at when deciding whether a place qualifies as a traditional
51. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479-80 (1988) (citations omitted).
52. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990).
53. See United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995)); see
also Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-78 (1998); Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1983).
54. See, e.g., Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727; Paulsen v. Lehman, 839 F. Supp 147,
157-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
55. See Kindt v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 67 F.3d 266, 269 (9th Cir.
1995).
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public forum. Many courts have held that, barring special
circumstances, streets and parks are the quintessential public
forums.56 This is because those areas "have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions."5 7 Similarly, sidewalks
have been held to be traditional public fora.s
Quite importantly, one does not have to show that the specific
street in question has been used for public debate in order for it to be
treated as a traditional public forum: "[n]o particularized inquiry into
the precise nature of a specific street is necessary; all public streets
are held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional
public fora." 59 Thus public places that have been "historically
associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as
streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, to be
'public forums."' 60
2. Are Public Beaches Traditional Public Forums?
Even if streets, sidewalks, and parks are quintessential traditional
public forums and even if any laws that inhibit free speech within
those forums must be strictly scrutinized, it may not be immediately
apparent how any of this applies to the laws that prohibit on-street
parking near shoreline access points. To make the connection clearer,
this section will ask and answer two questions: first, whether beaches
can properly be considered public forums; and, second, if beaches are
public forums, whether parking restrictions that make it impractical
56. See, e.g., Eagon ex rel. Eagon v. City of Elk City, 72 F.3d 1480, 1486 (10th
Cir. 1996); Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d 1287
(7th Cir. 1996).
57. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S.
496, 515 (1939)).
58. See Int'l Caucus of Labor Comms. v. City of Montgomery, 111 F.3d 1548,
1550 (11th Cir. 1997) ("A sidewalk, although specifically constructed for
pedestrian traffic, also constitutes a public forum.") (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474, 480 (1988)); see also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
59. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481.
60. See Grace, 461 U.S. at 177; see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 515 (1976); Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941); Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
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for anyone to reach the beach, except for people living or staying
near access points to the beach, can violate a public's right to access
the traditional public forum.
3. Are Beaches Different from "Traditional" Parks for Purposes of
Public Forums Analysis?
In Paulsen v. Lehman,61 the founder of a Christian Evangelical
organization sued the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation,
and Historic Preservation and its commissioner (SOP), alleging that
they violated his right to freedom of expression and free exercise of
religion by prohibiting him from distributing non-commercial
62
religious literature in a state park without a permit. At the very
beginning of his opinion, Judge Spatt states SOP's position, which
was that beaches are very different places than parks, roads, and
other traditional public forum, because beaches perform a very
different function in our public lives. Judge Spatt's opening provides
an almost adoring description of beaches before he restates SOP's
position:
Say the word "beach" to most Americans and they will
conjure images of cool breezes beneath a piercing sun,
swimmers diving under breaking waves, ships bobbing on
the horizon line, and evening strolls along a boardwalk
under an azure sky. "Beaches" have been the subject of
plaintive poems, raucous records, and comedic as well as
melancholic motion pictures.
So far as the defendants in this case are concerned, it is
this visualization of the "beach experience" which lies at
the heart of the controversy now before the Court. The
plaintiff wishes to distribute his noncommercial religious
literature at Jones Beach State Park, perhaps the most
utilized beach area on all of Long Island. The defendants
contend that the plaintiff's activities should be restricted, to
allow the citizens of Long Island to "attend the beach and
61. Paulsen v. Lehman, 839 F. Supp. 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
62. Id. at 150.
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commune with nature and relieve the stress and concerns of
day to day life," without such disruption.63
According to SOP, "tradition and custom ma[d]e the beach area
unsuitable for distribution of leaflets, as are public access areas such
as the entrances to park offices, restaurants, restrooms, theater, and
first aid areas." 64 While SOP conceded that sidewalks within Jones
Beach State Park might be designated public forums, it argued that
the beach was a non-public forum.65
The court in Paulsen could not find any cases decided by the
United States Supreme Court or the Second Circuit discussing the
66forum status of beaches. In fact, the court could only find one
federal case that discussed "the forum status of a combined beach
and state park setting . . . ." That case was Naturist Society, Inc. v.
Fillyaw (Fillyaw 1),68 and, because the Paulsen court found the
"striking similarities in the physical composition of the forum," the
court looked to the Eleventh Circuit for guidance.69
In Fillyaw I, a group that advocated nudism sought permission to
distribute literature and circulate petitions at John D. MacArthur
Beach State Park in Palm Beach County, Florida.70 One of the main
disputes in Fillyaw I was whether the beach itself was a public
forum. The defendant argued that beaches were not like city parks,
which are quintessential public forums, because people engage in
behaviors, such as wearing limited clothing, which would make
unsolicited communication more intrusive and unwelcome. While the
district court accepted the defendant's arguments distinguishing
63. Id.
64. Id. at 155.
65. Id. at 154-55.
66. Id. at 159-60.
67. Id. at 160.
68. Naturist Soc'y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter
Fillyaw I].
69. Paulsen, 839 F. Supp. at 160.
70. Id. (citing Naturist Soc'y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 736 F. Supp. 1103, 1106 (S.D.
Fla. 1990)). The Paulsen court also found support in Gerritsen v. City of L.A., 994
F.2d 570, 576 (9th Cir. 1993), where the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's
contention that certain "blue-line" areas in Los Angeles' El Pueblo Park were
distinct from the rest of the park for First Amendment purposes due to their
"special ambience." Paulsen, 839 F. Supp. at 160-61.
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beaches from other parks, the Eleventh Circuit court in Fillyaw I
rejected these arguments.
The Paulsen court chose to follow Fillyaw I and extensively
quoted from the appellate court's decision:
Moreover, the facts the district court recites do not render
the park a non-public forum. City parks are quintessential
public forums. In these parks, as at the beach, the public
may swim, play games, rest, and enjoy the surroundings.
Although the district court remarked on the small size of
John D. MacArthur Beach State Park, most city parks are
even smaller, presenting the same space problems the
district court contemplated. As at the beach, people
sunbathe in city parks, sometimes in less than the usual
amount of clothing, and they often arrange their
possessions around themselves, making it difficult to move
when someone approaches them. As at John D. MacArthur
Beach State Park, many city parks suffer a shortage of law
enforcement personnel. In short, none of the facts the
district court found adequately distinguish John D.
MacArthur Beach State Park from a typical city park for
First Amendment purposes. 71
Following Fillyaw I, the Paulsen court held that Jones Beach State
Park was a public forum, even though its main attraction was its
extensive beach.
Even though the Paulsen court extensively quotes Fillyaw I and, in
doing so, strongly suggests that the beach is as much part of the
public forum as the rest of the park, the court does not specifically
state in its holding that the sand portion of Jones Beach State Park is
included in the public forum. This could be due to the limited relief
that was requested by the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff did not
concede that the beaches were not part of the public forum, he
nonetheless decided not to contest that issue and to instead only seek
greater access to the pedestrian walkways and thoroughfares, the
central mall area, and the boardwalk.72
71. Paulsen, 839 F. Supp. at 160 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 152-53, 170.
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When the Eleventh Circuit decided Fillyaw I, it remanded the case
back to the district court. In Naturist Society v. Fillyaw (Fillyaw II),73
the court directly addressed the question of whether stricter limits on
speech could be applied to the sandy beach than to other parts of the
park. In addition to many other challenges to the rules governing
speech at MacArthur Beach State Park, the plaintiffs challenged a
rule that prohibited them from approaching people on the beach to
discuss their issue or to pass out leaflets.74 Considering that the
appellate court in Fillyaw I held that sunbathing, skimpy clothes, and
other aspects of enjoying the beach did not justify treating beaches
differently than city parks for purposes of forum analysis,7 5 the
Fillyaw II court, perhaps surprisingly, held that prohibiting any
speech activity on the beach was an allowable time, place, and
manner restriction. 76 Quite importantly, for the purposes of this
article, the Fillyaw II court does not dispute that the beach is a public
forum. Nonetheless, because the legal analysis of the Fillyaw II is
flawed and because the case could cause confusion as to whether
beaches are traditional public fora, it is necessary to look at Fillyaw
II in some detail.
The Fillyaw II court began by laying out the test by which all time,
place and manner restrictions must be judged: "such restrictions are
legitimate only if they 'are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample
alternative channels of communication."' 7 8 The park's rules were
content neutral79 so the court focused on whether the rules were
narrowly tailored, promoted a significant governmental interest, and
whether there were adequate alternative channels for communication.
As can be seen in the quote below, the Fillyaw II court sought to
distinguish MacArthur Beach State Park from other busier beaches
73. Naturist Soc'y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 858 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Fla. 1994)
[hereinafter Fillyaw II].
74. Id. at 1562-63.
75. Fillyaw I, 958 F.2d at 1522-23.
76. See Fillyaw I, 858 F. Supp. at 1569.
77. Id. at 1567.
78. Fillyaw I, 958 F.2d at 1523 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
79. Fillyaw I, 858 F. Supp. at 1566-67.
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and to show that the state had a significant interest in protecting the
park's unique character.
MacArthur Beach State Park ... was purchased in order to
preserve the undeveloped natural beauty of the Florida
landscape for the enjoyment of citizens and tourists . . . .
[T]he goal of the Florida Department of Natural Resources
[is] to provide an alternative to the noisy, commercialized
parks and beaches which now predominate the state.
Secluded and protected, MacArthur Beach State Park offers
visitors . . . a tranquil environment, which is
uncharacteristic of the traditional public park.
The defendant argues that the rules challenged by the
plaintiffs are narrowly tailored to serve the following
interests of the state: (1) to protect the rights of individual
beachgoers to their privacy and freedom from
confrontations with demonstrators; (2) to ensure park
visitors a unique recreational experience based on the
natural environment; and (3) to promote park aesthetics.80
Even though the court acknowledges that it "would be completely
inconsistent with First Amendment principles to hold that visitors to
[MacArthur Beach] carry with them an inherent right to privacy and
freedom from demonstrators," the court goes on to hold that "the
state may have a legitimate interest in providing a certain degree of
privacy and freedom from demonstrators in particular areas of the
park, to the extent that may be necessary to prevent interference with
the intended use of those areas."81 Without evidence, the court states
that it is "a well-known fact" that tourists and residents are attracted
to Florida's "unique natural recourses" and that the state "obviously
has a significant interest in continuing to offer, and remaining able to
deliver, this unique recreational experience . . . ."82 Thus, the court
finds that "[iun those areas of the park where visitors may experience
the park's unique environment on a most intimate level, such as on
80. Id. at 1567.
81. Id. (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)).
82. Id.
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the beach or the nature trails, they are entitled to some privacy and
freedom from solicitation." 83
While the Fillyaw II court was willing to severely limit freedom of
speech on rather secluded beaches, apparently these limitations could
not be applied to popular and at times crowded beaches such as Jones
Beach State Park in New York, which was the subject of Paulsen v.
Lehman.84 Still, it is far from obvious that handing out pamphlets and
similar activities would really "severely undermine" "the visitor's
ability to appreciate the sights and sounds of nature."85 For example,
would a person's visit to the beach really be "severely undermined"
if a stranger politely asked them if they would care for a hand bill
with information about a particular issue? The intrusion seems minor
at worst and hence, the total prohibition seems unnecessary.
Similarly, someone sitting on the beach with a sign of a reasonable
size would seem unlikely to defeat the purposes of the park.
In fact, the court's short discussion of the possibility of prior
political activity on the beach seems to lend some support to the
conclusion that allowing some political speech on the beach will not
seriously disrupt people's enjoyment of the beach. The plaintiffs
argued that the rules had been applied in a discriminatory manner to
them because another organization had been allowed to solicit
political support on the beach. According to the plaintiffs, "an
organization known as Florida Free Beaches entered MacArthur
Beach State Park, approached beach goers, and distributed visors
with messages urging people to vote in favor of beach bonds." 86 The
court, however, found no evidence of discrimination because there
was no evidence that the defendants ever knew that the political
activity was going to occur. The court, unfortunately, does not look at
the consequences of this political activity. If Florida Free Beaches
had spent the day "severely undermining" the beach goers attempts to
appreciate nature, one might think that the park staff and
administrators would have received complaints and that these
complaints would have been used to help justify the park's severe
restrictions on speech on the beach. However, as was mentioned
83. Id. at 1568.
84. Paulsen v. Lehman, 839 F. Supp 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
85. Fillyaw II, 858 F. Supp. at 1568.
86. Id. at 1567.
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above, the court found that there was no evidence in the record
indicating that the park staff even knew the political activity had
occurred, which means that no complaints were introduced as
evidence.
In Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale,8 7 the Eleventh Circuit's
decision had strong similarities to Fillyaw II. In Smith, the city of
Fort Lauderdale prohibited soliciting, begging, or panhandling on the
beach.88 While the Eleventh Circuit held that the public beach was
conclusively a public forum,89 it also held that the City had a
significant interest in "eliminating nuisance activity on the
beach ... ."90 Finally, the court deferred to the city's judgment on the
necessity for the complete prohibition:
The [c]ity has made the discretionary determination that
begging in this designated, limited beach area adversely
impacts tourism. Without second-guessing that judgment,
which lies well within the [c]ity's discretion, we cannot
conclude that banning begging in this limited beach area
burdens "substantially more speech than is necessary to
further the government's legitimate interest."91
Thus, while the court held that the beach is a traditional public forum,
it allowed the city to use regulations to eliminate one type of
expressive activity, i.e., begging, from that forum in order to protect
the local tourism economy.
87. Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 1999).
88. Id. at 956 ("Like other charitable solicitation, begging is speech entitled to
First Amendment protection."); see Loper v. N.Y. City Police Dept., 999 F.2d 699,
704 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding "begging is at least 'a form of speech' because of the
lack of material distinctions between begging and other forms of charitable
solicitation); see also Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444
U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (holding charitable organizations' solicitations for
contributions are protected speech).
89. Smith, 177 F.3d at 956 ("Additionally, this Court's precedent conclusively
establishes that the Fort Lauderdale Beach area covered by Rule 7.5(c)-consisting
of beach and sidewalk spaces-is a public forum.").
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting One World Family Now v. City of Miami Beach, 175 F.3d
1282, 1287 (11th Cir.1999)).
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In U.S. v. Frandsen,92 the Eleventh Circuit in dicta again seemed to
signal its willingness to allow greater restrictions on speech on the
beach than elsewhere in the park:
The state park in Fillyaw is almost identical to the national
park in this case. Both the national park here and the state
park in Fillyaw are open to the general public and consist
of beaches, sidewalks, and parking areas. Particularly
applicable to the present case, we explained in Fillyaw:
"[T]he park is more than a beach. In particular, it contains
parking lots, a nature center, and walkways. Speech and
expressive conduct in these areas may not pose the same
evils as on the beach. In declaring the park a non-public
forum based solely upon its beach characteristics, the
district court ignored other areas of the park which are not
beach."93
The Frandsen court struck down the national park's requirement
that the plaintiffs obtain a permit before passing out pamphlets
because there was no specific time within which the Superintendent
had to respond to an application for a permit. Consequently, the
court's comment on the alleged evils of speech activity on beaches is
dicta because the permit requirement was unconstitutional as long as
any portion of the national park was a public forum. Moreover, the
court's selective quoting of Fillyaw I is potentially misleading. In the
paragraph immediately following the one quoted by Frandsen, the
Fillyaw I court disagrees with the determination of the trial court that
beaches are markedly different than other public parks. For example,
the Fillyaw I court points out that in city parks and at the beach,
people swim and sunbathe in "less than the usual amount of
clothing ... .94
Leydon v. Town of Greenwich95 is a more recent case that looked at
whether a beach could be a public forum.96 In Leydon, the plaintiff
92. United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2000).
93. Id. at 1241 n.4 (quoting Fillyaw I, 958 F.2d 1515, 1522 (11th Cir. 1992)).
94. Fillyaw I, 958 F.2d at 1522-23.
95. Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552 (Conn. 2001).
96. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 455 F.3d
910, 916 (9th Cir. 2006) ("The airspace is not, as the Center argues, an extension of
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sought an injunction to stop the Town of Greenwich from enforcing
an ordinance that limited access to a town park with a beach to town
residents and their guests. 97 The plaintiff argued that the town's
residents only policy violated: (1) the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution, (2) the first article (§§ 4, 5, and 14) of the
Connecticut Constitution, and (3) a state common law doctrine under
which municipal parks are held in trust for the use of all members of
the public. 98 While the appellate court ruled that the town's ordinance
violated the town's trust obligations to the public, the Connecticut
Supreme Court chose not to decide whether a common law doctrine
existed under which Greenwich held the park for use by the public at
large. Instead, the Connecticut Supreme Court decided the case
solely on constitutional grounds. This was a somewhat unusual
approach because normally the court would have considered the
plaintiffs common law claim to avoid making an unnecessary
constitutional adjudication. However, the court deviated from its
normal practice for two reasons:
First, we are persuaded that the plaintiffs constitutional
claim is plainly meritorious, whereas the common-law
doctrine upon which the Appellate Court relied never
before has provided the basis for a holding of a court of this
state. Second, that common-law doctrine, if it exists, would
be subject to legislative abrogation, whereas the
constitutional principles advanced by the plaintiff are not.99
Following reasoning of the Paulsen and Fillyaw I courts, the
Leydon court had no trouble finding that the park was a public forum
for First Amendment purposes. Greenwich Point contained many of
the features that are commonly associated with public parks, such as
picnic shelters, ponds, a marina, a parking lot, open fields, a nature
the fora below, namely the beaches. We do not express an opinion as to whether
the beaches are public fora because the record is not developed on this point and
this categorization is not necessary to our analysis. But even assuming that the
beaches are public fora, the airspace above is not a public forum by extension.").
97. Leydon, 777 A.2d at 557-58.
98. Id. at 560-61.
99. Id. at 565 n.20; see, e.g., Packer v. Bd. of Educ., 717 A.2d 117, 124 (Conn.
1998).
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preserve, walkways, trails, picnic areas with picnic tables, a library
book drop, and a beach.100 The Leydon court was unconvinced that
the presence of a natural beach should make any difference in their
analysis: "The fact that Greenwich Point has a boundary on the Long
Island Sound that serves as a beach for swimming, sun bathing and
other activities in no way alters its character as a park."101 In the
court's view, Greenwich Point was a traditional public forum.
The Leydon court went further, however, and opined that a park
that was a beach without any of the features often found in city parks
could nonetheless be a traditional public forum: "We do not mean to
suggest that a municipal beach without some or all of the other
attributes of Greenwich Point would not constitute a park-and,
therefore, a traditional public forum-for first amendment
purposes."102 After finding that the park was a public forum, the
court in Leydon also found that Greenwich had "failed to explain
why the ordinance's virtual ban on nonresidents is a reasonable time,
place or manner restriction on the use of the park by such
nonresidents." 103 Moreover, the court in Leydon ruled that even if one
assumed Greenwich had a compelling interest in restricting access,
Greenwich had not shown that the ordinance was not narrowly
tailored and, therefore, the ordinance was unconstitutional. 104
The Leydon court, however, did not rest its decision on the U.S.
Constitution alone. Instead the Leydon court also determined that the
Greenwich ordinance violated free speech and assembly protections
provided by the Connecticut Constitution. In doing so, the Leydon
court did not use the forum-based approach, but instead adopted the
"compatibility" test set forth in Grayned v. Rockford.1 05 Pursuant to
the compatibility test, "'the crucial question is whether the manner of
expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a
particular place at a particular time."' 106 Thus, the Leydon court
actually looked to see what type of speech activities occur on beaches
and whether those activities were a significant problem.
100. Leydon, 777 A.2d at 570.
101. Id. at 570-71.
102. Id. at 571 n.29.
103. Id. at 572.
104. Id. at 572-73.
105. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
106. Leydon, 777 A.2d at 574 (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116).
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The court in Fillyaw II also cited Grayned when determining
whether the MacArthur Beach State Park had a legitimate interest in
prohibiting speakers from approaching people on the beach with
information concerning a clothing optional lifestyle. 107 The ruling in
Grayned, however, does not fully support the Fillyaw II decision.
Grayned struck down restrictions on picketing on a sidewalk in front
of a school, but upheld a prohibition on the use of amplification
systems.1os In other words, Grayned upheld restrictions on the
manner of expression, but struck down restrictions on the place of
expression. By contrast, Fillyaw II upheld a rule that banned the
plaintiffs from engaging the public at any time and in any manner in
a place, i.e., the beach. 109
4. What Types of Expressive Activities Occur on Beaches?
Even though the Leydon court opined that no specific inquiry into
the actual use of a space is required once a space has been
determined to be a traditional public forum under the forum based
approach, 110 the court in Leydon did look at the record for evidence
of speech activity on the beach at Greenwich Point when applying
the compatibility test:
107. Fillyaw II, 858 F. Supp. 1559, 1567-68 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
108. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 106, 119.
109. Fillyaw II, 858 F. Supp. at 1569. Later in the case, Fillyaw II again cites
Grayned to support the court's decision to uphold a prohibition on the use of
amplification equipment anywhere in the park. Id.
110. Leydon, 777 A.2d. at 567-68 n.23 ("We note that, as a general matter, under
the forum-based approach adopted by the United States Supreme Court, courts do
not conduct a particularized inquiry into the manner in which the specific public
property at issue historically has been used. The inquiry, rather, is whether, in light
of the objective characteristics of that property, it is a street, sidewalk or park in the
traditional or conventional sense of those terms. If so, the property is a public
forum for purposes of first amendment analysis."); see also United States v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171 (1983) (.'[P]ublic places' historically associated with the free
exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are
considered, without more, to be 'public forums."'); Warren v. Fairfax Cnty., 196
F.3d 186, 191 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Since it is so likely that any given street, sidewalk,
or park meets all three characteristics of a traditional public forum a court can
generally treat a street, sidewalk, or park as a traditional public forum without
making a 'particularized inquiry."').
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[P]hotographs were introduced into evidence at trial to
show a sand castle exhibition on the beach, along with a
sand sculpture depicting a giant hand clawing its way onto
a ledge cut into the beach with an adjacent sign stating:
"Stamford Law Student Gaining Access to Greenwich
Beach." The plaintiff also introduced into evidence copies
of pamphlets distributed on the beach seeking to mobilize
support and contributions for the town's legal effort, in
conjunction with the association, to defeat the plaintiffs
lawsuit. Finally, testimony adduced at trial indicated that
candidates for public office have campaigned at Greenwich
Point, and that both the Democratic and Republican parties
and the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People have hosted gatherings there.
The Leydon court also noted that it was easy to think of expressive
activities that would not conflict with a day at the beach. For
example, one might sit or walk "on the beach in a T-shirt that
expresses a particular political view or religious conviction" or
"participat[e] in a silent vigil."11 2
Because a broad range of communicative activities is
constitutionally protected, one should not be surprised to find such
constitutionally protected activities occurring on beaches. In addition
to pamphleting, picketing, and t-shirts with slogans, protected
communication includes dancing, music, and other forms of artistic
expression.113 In fact, the cases above discuss communicative
activity. For example, in Fillyaw II the court mentions that members
of the organization known as Florida Free Beaches approached beach
goers and distributed visors with messages encouraging support for a
bond measure for beaches.1 14
111. Leydon, 777 A.2d at 570-71 n.28.
112. Id. at 575.
113. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1298
(1993).
114. Fillyaw II, 858 F. Supp. at 1567. The plaintiffs argued that they were being
discriminated against because other groups had exercised their rights to speech on
the beach. Id. The court, however, rejected this argument because there was no
evidence that the defendant either issued a permit to the group or knew about their
political activity on the beach. Id.
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The Paulsen court noted a great deal of expressive activity
occurring at Jones Beach State Park:
Over the years, the grounds of Jones Beach State Park have
been used for "milk runs" by the Easter Seals Society,
professional photography sessions, baptismal and other
services and literature distribution by various religious
organizations, folk dancing groups, scientific and nature
studies, go-cart racing, lifeguard union activities, live radio
broadcasts, celestial navigation courses, salt marsh
research, baton twirling competitions, local union
picketing, an annual "Greekfest" and a bike tour benefit.
Obviously, many of these events are non-commercial,
expressive activity.
While the court is not absolutely clear as to which of these activities
occurred on the beach, at a minimum, the Greekfest did occur on the
sand itself.116
The discomfort that some of the judges have with allowing
communicative and expressive activities on beaches seems
misguided because beaches are often the site of artistic and political
activities. For instance, the organized mass beach cleanup is a
political organizing tool and an act of political theater that is intended
to bring the problem of ocean pollution to the attention of the larger
public. In fact, this form of expression now includes International
Coastal Clean-Up Day, which in 2012 occurred in eighty-eight
countries and forty-four U.S. states. Another example of creating a
spectacle on the beach to raise public awareness is the Annual Bay
Swim that is sponsored by Save the Bay in Rhode Island. While the
swimming of Narragansett Bay is an important fundraising event for
the environmental organization, hordes of jubilant swimmers stumble
wet onto the beach at the finish creating a photo-op for the local
115. Paulsen v. Lehman, 839 F. Supp. 147, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (citation
omitted).
116. Id. at 153.
117. OCEAN CONSERVANCY, WORKING FOR CLEAN BEACHES AND CLEAN WATER
18-19 (2013), available at http://issuu.com/1franke/docs/tfsdatareport web full
(globally, 561,633 volunteers collected 10,149,988 pounds of trash during the 2012
cleanup).
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newspapers and television stations. A spokesperson is on hand from
Save the Bay to respond to the reporters' questions and to promote
the group's message that more needs to be done to protect the state's
marine environment.
Beach cleanups can also respond to a localized pollution event.
While the participants surely hope to lessen the damage caused by
the polluting event, such cleanup efforts also create the opportunity
to make a broadly disseminated political statement when the media
covers the cleanup. For instance, the Rhode Island chapter of
Surfriderl18 organized a series of shoreline cleanups after the spoils
from a dredging project were dumped just offshore and large
amounts of debris began washing up on the sand and cobble beaches
of the Rhode Island Sound. 119 The dredge materials came from a
nearby fishing port and contained just about everything that might
ever be found on a fishing boat.120 Rather than holding a press
conference at the fishing port, the environmental group chose to meet
with the newspaper and television reporters during the beach cleanup.
This allowed newspaper readers and television viewers to see
pictures of piles of trash (space heaters, knives, oil filters, beer cans,
lobster pots, rubber gloves, and so forth). The readers and viewers
also saw Surfrider taking responsibility for the beach, which arguably
made Surfrider seem more credible when it accused the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers and fishing community of not taking
responsibility.
Beach protests can also be in response to specific development
threats. For example, when a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal
was proposed offshore of Malibu, a group called Coastal Advocates
staged a large protest on the beach that included such international
stars as Pierce Brosnan and Halle Berry.121 The stars and surfers wore
t-shirts saying "No LNG," and created a media event on the beach.
Another example of a project-specific, beach protest in California
118. See SURFRIDER FOUND., http://www.surfrider.org (last visited Feb. 9, 2014)
(an an international nonprofit organization that supports protecting the ocean and
coastal resources and public access to the shoreline).
119. See Elizabeth Gudrais, Volunteers Clean Beaches after Pt. Judith Dredging,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Feb. 4, 2007, at B1.
120. Id.
121. Stop the BHP Billiton LNG Terminal Now!, COASTAL ADVOCS., http://
www.coastaladvocates.com/facts.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
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occurred when a toll road was proposed near the shore in San Diego
County. Surfrider and other organizations opposed the new highway
because they asserted that it would degrade the natural beauty and
serenity of the area and because erosion from the construction of the
road could destroy some world-class surf breaks.122 The beach below
the proposed toll road became an important site for promoting
opposition to the new road.
Protests at the beach, however, did not begin with the
environmental movement. For instance, the beaches of St. Augustine,
Florida, were important sites for protest during the Civil Rights
Movement. In 1963 and 1964, protests by blacks on the whites-only
beaches turned violent and attracted national attention to the
segregationist laws of this tourist destination.123 The exclusion of
African Americans from public beaches was not limited to Florida or
even the South. For example, Robert Garcia and Erica Flores
Baltodano have written about segregated beaches of Southern
Californial24 and Marc R. Poirier has written about exclusionary
beach access policies and racial discrimination in New Jersey and
Connecticut.125
While beaches have clearly been the sites for political protests,
beaches are commonly used for all sorts of political and expressive
activities. For instance, the Leydon court noted that political
pamphlets had been passed out at the beach and political candidates
had campaigned in the park.126 Furthermore, just as many
communities have summer concerts in their parks, for example, there
122. Save the Trestles: Stop the 241 Toll Road Extension, SURFRIDER FOUND.,
http://savetrestles.surfrider.org (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). These surf breaks are
collectively known as Trestles. These breaks include Cotton's Point, Upper
Trestles, Lower Trestles, and Church. MATT WARSHAW, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SURFING 649-50 (2005). Trestles are considered by many to be America's most
consistent surf break and it has been featured in over fifty surf movies and videos.
Id.
123. See MAXINE D. JONES & KEVIN M. MCCARTHY, AFRICAN AMERICANS IN
FLORIDA 113-15 (1993); DAVID R. COLBURN, RACIAL CHANGE AND COMMUNITY
CRISIS: ST. AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA, 1877-1980, at 98 (1991); DAN R. WARREN, IF IT
TAKES ALL SUMMER: MARTIN LUTHER KING, THE KKK, AND STATE'S RIGHTS IN
ST. AUGUSTINE, 1964, at 127-28 (2008).
124. Garcia & Baltodano, supra note 7, at 153-54.
125. Poirier, Environmental Justice, supra note 7, at 755-811.
126. Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 570-71 n.28 (Conn. 2001).
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are musical performances on the beach in Rhode Island every
summer. The Rhode Island Philharmonic performs to a large crowd
at Narragansett Beach, Rhode Island, every July.127 MUSic on the
beach is also an important component of the Governor's Bay Day
activities at Rhode Island state parks when live musicians perform
from temporary stages, on-the-beach broadcasts of radio stations can
be heard from loudspeakers across the beach, and a wide range of
groups engage in educational activities.128 Narragansett Beach also
acts as the starting and finishing line for numerous runs that support
various charitable organizations. For instance, the Rhode Island State
Police 5K Foot Pursuit begins and ends at the beach each year. 129
5. Are Beaches Public Thoroughfares?
In the most recent case to consider whether a beach can be a public
forum, Kroll v. Incline Village General Improvement District,130 the
court ruled that the beach in question was not a public forum. The
plaintiffs in Kroll sued the Incline Village General Improvement
District (IVGID or District) because only owners of property that was
part of the District when it acquired the beach property in 1968 had
full access to the beach. The plaintiffs, all of whom owned property
that was added to the District after 1969, sued to gain access to the
beach, arguing that the beach was a traditional public forum and that
the District was violating their First Amendment right to free speech
by excluding them from the beach.131 While the plaintiffs relied on
Leydon to argue that the beach was a traditional public forum, the
United States District Court for Nevada opined that the Leydon
court's interpretation of federal law was not consistent with the Ninth
127. For the 2013 summer pops schedule, see 2013 Summer Pops Series, R.I.
PHILHARMONIC ORCHESTRA & MUSIC SCHOOL, http://www.ri-philharmonic.org/
Orchestra/Concerts/SummerPops/tabid/251/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2014),
which includes three traditional parks and the Narragansett Town Beach.
128. 2011 Governor's Bay Day, OFF. OF GOVERNOR LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, http://
www.governor.ri.gov/bayday/index.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
129. For information about and pictures from this year's run, see About the Race,
R.I. ST. POLICE, http://www.risp.ri.gov/5k (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
130. Kroll v. Incline Vill. Gen. Improvement Dist., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D.
Nev. 2009).
131. Id. at 1121.
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Circuit's interpretation and, therefore, not persuasive.132 According to
the Kroll court, the Ninth Circuit evaluated three factors in
determining whether an area constitutes a traditional public forum:
(1) [T]he actual use and purposes of the property,
particularly status as a public thoroughfare and availability
of free public access to the area; (2) the area's physical
characteristics, including its location and the existence of
clear boundaries delimiting the area; and (3) [the]
traditional or historic use of both the property in question
and other similar properties.133
As for the first part of the Ninth Circuit's public forum test, the
Kroll court stated that the District's "beach properties are not public
thoroughfares, and there has never been free public access to the
area."1 34 The beach in Kroll was on freshwater Lake Tahoe, and thus,
its geomorphology differed in important ways from the open ocean
beaches that are the subject of this article. Open ocean beaches are
subject to much more wave energy and can be much wider and
longer. So while the beach in Kroll may not have been used as a
thoroughfare, open ocean beaches frequently serve this purpose.
The use of open ocean beaches as thoroughfares might, in fact,
prove decisive in some cases if an individual inquiry is required.
While many town beaches and state beaches are clearly analogous to
city parks for purposes of public forum analysis, many other public
access points where parking is restricted lead to "unimproved"
beaches. There are no lifeguards, no bathhouses, no concerts, and no
132. Id. at 1127 n.7.
133. Id. at 1127 (quoting Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v. City of Las
Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2003)).
134. Id. As for the second part of the test, the court found that "there are also
clear boundaries delimiting the area, including gates, signs, and IVGID employees
who control access to the properties. These boundaries are not cosmetic
differences, but rather clearly demarcated boundaries that necessarily would alter
visitors' expectations of its public forum status." Id. at 1128. As for the last part of
the part of the Ninth Circuit's public forum test, the IVGID court noted "the beach
properties have never been used as public parks, but only as beach recreation areas
for the limited set of IVGID property owners whose property was a part of IVGID
as of 1968." Id.
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refreshment stands. However, even if, for the sake of argument, one
entertains the view that beaches without facilities are not analogous
to parks for purposes of public forum analysis, the courts have also
stated that public thoroughfares are traditional public forums, and,
upon closer examination, one can see that beaches often act as public
thoroughfares.
At first glance, one might not associate open ocean beaches with
thoroughfares. The tendency to define thoroughfares as major streets
seems particularly common in transportation planning. For instance,
the Planning and Development Department for Houston, Texas,
defines a "thoroughfare" as a street that is "more than 3 miles long;
connects freeways and principal thoroughfares; [has] more than
20,000 vehicles per day; [and they are] usually spaced one-half to
one mile apart."1 35 Even if beaches do not convey such heavy traffic,
beaches in many areas are in fact used for travel by automobiles. 136
For example, the right to drive automobiles on the beach is protected
by Oregon's Beach Billl37 and the Texas Open Beach Law. 138 The
right to drive on beaches is also fiercely defended in the National
Seashores of Cape Cod in Massachusetts and the Outer Banks of
North Carolina. 139 Even though traffic on these beaches does not
come close to 20,000 vehicles per day, that does not mean that they
are not thoroughfares, because historically, the definition of what is a
thoroughfare has been broader than the one frequently used in
transportation planning.
The Oxford English Dictionary provides the following range of
definitions for "thoroughfare," which are clearly relevant to public
forum analysis:
135. See Planning and Development: Major Thoroughfare & Freeway Plan,
CITY OF Hous., http://www.houstontx.gov/planning/DevelopRegs/mobility/
MTFP.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
136. See, e.g., Joseph Matuk & Carolyn LaBarbiera, Beach Driving: Part 2,
SURFRIDER FOUND. (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.surfrider.org/coastal-blog/entry/
beach-driving-part-ii.
137. OR. ADMIN. R. 736-021-0060 (2013) (Motor Vehicles and Other Motorized
Devices).
138. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 61.0011(d)(3), 61.022(b) (West 2013).
139. Cape Hatteras National Seashore: Off-Road Vehicle Use, U.S. NAT'L PARK
SERV., http://www.nps.gov/caha/planyourvisit/off-road-vehicle-use.htm (last
updated Jan. 21, 2014).
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(1) A passage or way through. (a) In general sense; alsofig.
Now usually merged in sense c, exc. in phr. No
thoroughfare, no public way through or right of way here.
(b) spec. A town through which traffic passes; a town on a
highway or line of traffic. Obs. (c) A road, street, lane, or
path forming a communication between two other roads or
streets, or between two places; a public way unobstructed
and open at both ends; esp. a main road or street, a
highway.
When applying the public forum analysis, courts have not
surprisingly found a wide variety of places to be public
thoroughfares. For example, in United States v. Kokinda, the court
referred to public sidewalks as thoroughfare, stating, "[tihe municipal
sidewalk that runs parallel to the road in this case is a public
passageway. The Postal Service's sidewalk is not such a
thoroughfare."l40 In United Church of Christ v. Gateway Economic
Development Corporation of Greater Cleveland, Inc., the court held
that a walkway on the grounds of a privately owned sports stadium
was a public thoroughfare because it was used by the public to go
between public streets.141 In Int'1 Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, Justice Kennedy wrote in his concurring opinion that "the
public spaces in the airports are broad, public thoroughfares."l 42
While the majority of the court disagreed, Blackman, Stevens and
Souter joined in his concurring opinion.
Coastal communities have historically used the beaches as a way
of passing between points. From the time the colonists first settled
the country to the present, one can find examples of beaches being
used as a natural thoroughfare between places. For example, when
describing the development of the communities around Old Orchard,
Maine, from the 1630s through the nineteenth century, Roy Fairfield
describes "the hard-packed beach [as] the main 'road' between the
scattered coastal communities."1 43 The beach remained the main
140. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990).
141. United Church of Christ v. Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp. of Greater Cleveland,
Inc., 383 F.3d 449, 452 (6th Cir. 2004).
142. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 700
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
143. Fairfield, supra note 13, at 228.
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transportation route for over one hundred years. 144 Another example
can be found in Timothy Dwight's early travelogue, Travels in New-
England and New-York, published in 1823. In it, Dwight discusses
how traveling along the wet beach is the easiest access to
Provincetown, Massachusetts.145 A contemporary example of the
importance of the beach as a thoroughfare connecting communities
can be found in the recent case originating on North Carolina's Outer
Banks: Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head.146 In that case, the court
upheld the town's order to demolish six cottages because they were
an "obstruction [that] threatened public safety by hampering the
ability of emergency vehicles to travel along the beach."1 47
In addition to using the beach to travel between human settlements,
the original colonists used the beaches as thoroughfares that led to
the bounty of the ocean and bays; and the bounty was truly diverse.
For example, the earliest court cases concerning the Public Trust
Doctrine clearly state that the colonists had the right to access the
shoreline to acquire fish, shellfish, and waterfowl. 148 According to
the historian William Cronon, "whether rocky or sandy, the seashore
was a zone of abundance from which both groups [Native Americans
and the first European settlers] obtained food."1 49 For instance,
144. Id.
145. TIMOTHY DWIGHT, TRAVELS IN NEW-ENGLAND AND NEW-YORK 83-84
(1823).
146. Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533 (4th Cir. 2013).
147. Id. at 543.
148. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 16 (1894) (holding that shorelines are
subject to 'a public trust for the benefit of the whole community, to be freely used
by all for navigation and fishery, as well for shellfish as floating fish,'-and not as
'private property. . . .') (quoting Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
409, 413 (1842)); see also Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 414 ("[T]he men who first
formed the English settlements, could not have been expected to encounter the
many hardships that unavoidably attended their emigration to the new world, and to
people the banks of its bays and rivers, if the land under the water at their very
doors was liable to immediate appropriation by another, as private property; and
the settler upon the fast land thereby excluded from its enjoyment, and unable to
take a shell-fish from its bottom, or fasten there a stake, or even bathe in its waters,
without becoming a trespasser upon the rights of another.").
149. See WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND
THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND 30-31 (1983). The abundance along the shore
that the Europeans encountered was beyond anything they had ever experienced.
One of the early European visitors described the alewives were spread across a
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lobster was so plentiful in Rhode Island in Colonial times that there
was a law limiting the number of times per week servants could be
fed lobster. 150 Lobster populations remained so large in the 1800s
that residents could still walk to the shore and harvest lobsters at low
tide.15 1 Of course, the gathering of shellfish by Native Americans and
settlers was not restricted to New England. For example, in State ex
rel. Thornton v. Hay,152 the Oregon Supreme Court established the
public's customary right to use the beach, in part, by noting that the
Native Americans gathered clams and cooked them on the beach,
which was an activity that was then adopted by the settlers.153
Early Americans also traveled the shore gathering the ocean's
flora. Near the beginning of Cape Cod, Thoreau tells of joining a
crowd of people down at the shoreline to witness the horror of a
shipwreck from the previous night.154 As he walks along the beach,
he comes upon farmers busily loading wagons with seaweed that had
been thrown up on the beach by the storm.1 55 The practice was not
restricted to Massachusetts. For example, the farmers of Rhode
Island would rush in their wagons down to the beach after storms to
collect the ocean's valuable natural fertilizer before the other farmers
carted it away. 156 In Rhode Island, the right to make one's way along
the beach to collect seaweed was not restricted to the owner of the
beach knee deep for a quarter mile as they struggled through their annual migration
from the ocean, up the streams, and into the freshwater ponds to spawn. Id. at 22-
23. "One observer described how a person running over exposed clam banks was
soon 'made all wet by their spouting of water." Id. at 30-31. For a discussion of the
New England Native Americans' acquiring a diversity of seafood and engaging in
recreational activities on the shore, see generally HOWARD S. RUSSEL, INDIAN NEW
ENGLAND BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER (1980).
150. THE UNCOMMON GUIDE TO COMMON LIFE OF NARRAGANSETT BAY 93
(Frederick D. Massie ed., 1998); see also Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 414; Shively,
152 U.S. at 17.
151. THE UNCOMMON GUIDE TO COMMON LIFE OF NARRAGANSETT BAY, supra
note 150, at 93.
152. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
153. Id. at 673 ("The first European settlers on these shores found the aboriginal
inhabitants using the foreshore for clam-digging and the dry-sand area for their
cooking fires. The newcomers continued these customs after statehood.").
154. THOREAU, supra note 8, at 15-19.
155. Id. at 18.
156. BETTY J. COTTER, SOUTH SHORE: RHODE ISLAND 43 (1999).
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beach front parcel, and the Rhode Island Constitution still protects
the right of every citizen to gather seaweed from the beach.
When Thoreau walked along Cape Cod's Great Beach, he also
encountered the "wreckers," who travelled up and down the beach
looking for different types of goods from wrecks that were thrown up
from the sea.1s For most of this nation's history, ships carried much
of the country's goods, and shipwrecks were not uncommon along
the Eastern Seaboard. 159 While many lives and fortunes were lost in
shipwrecks, the goods and wreckage that washed up on the beach
was a welcome opportunity for coastal residents. In Cape Cod,
Thoreau describes the wide array of riches that wreckers-who he
calls "the true monarch of the beach"-had salvaged from the sea,
including driftwood, rope, tow-cloth ("half a dozen bolts at a time"),
all sorts of clothes, iron, pear and plum trees, turnip-seeds, twenty
barrels of apples still in good shape, nutmegs, a valise, and an
assortment of coins. 160 According to Thoreau, "the inhabitants [of
Cape Cod] visit the beach to see what they have caught as regularly
as a fisherman his weir or a lumberer his boom; the Cape is their
boom."1 61 In other words, for coastal residents, the beach was a
thoroughfare that they traveled in search of material gain. Coastal
residents traveled the beach long after a ship had wrecked because
the ocean could cast up salvageable items long after the actual
disaster. In fact, during the days of coal burning steam ships, people
who lived near the beaches of southern Rhode Island, used to carry
coal away in buckets after a ship wrecked.162
Of course, the wrecker's bounty is not what it once was. In the
eighteenth and early nineteenth century when almost everything
people used was transported up and down the coast by ships,
157. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17. For a discussion of how important rockweed, clams,
and driftwood were to the coastal communities on Cape Cod, see John R. Stilgoe, A
New England Coastal Wilderness, 71 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 33, 43 (1981).
158. THOREAU, supra note 8, at 59-60; see also JOHN R. STILGOE, ALONGSHORE
11 (1994).
159. Stilgoe, supra note 157, at 57-68.
160. THOREAU, supra note 8, at 61, 73-74, 109, 114-16. Thoreau also talks
about a lighthouse keeper claiming $1,000 worth of blackfish that ran aground
during the night. Id. at 144.
161. THOREAU, supra note 8, at 115.
162. COTTER, supra note 156, at 54.
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shipwrecks were inevitable because captains lacked accurate nautical
charts and advanced weather forecasts. However, when the United
States Coastal Survey began to publish large numbers of accurate
navigational charts in the middle of the nineteenth century, the
country's losses from shipwrecks dropped markedly. 163
Yet, even if shipwrecks are rarer, the products of global trade still
find their way into the sea and eventually onto the beaches; but they
do so in a very different way. While we do not see the numerous
gliding sails of alongshore shipping that Thoreau witnessed from the
beach, the world's goods still move by ship. Over a hundred million
containers-each the size of a semi-truck-are shipped around the
world each year. 164 A typical container ship might carry 3,000 forty-
foot containers, stacked fifteen to twenty abreast and six or seven
high.165 Every year around 10,000 of these containers are lost at sea,
usually during severe storms.166 If a single lost container breaks open,
it might disgorge 17,000 hockey gloves, a million Lego pieces, or
any other buoyant product which will then float along (perhaps for
years) in the ocean's currents until they was ashore, often in large
numbers.167 In one noteworthy event in 1990, 78,932 Nike sneakers
from five containers were lost while crossing the Pacific on their way
to the United States. 168 When the shoes started to wash up onto
beaches in Washington and Oregon in large numbers, people
discovered that if one washed them with a little bleach, they were
perfectly good.169 Unfortunately, beachcombers would find an
assortment of mismatched styles and sizes.170 Relatively quickly,
though, an informal communication network evolved to facilitate
163. See MARK MONMONIER, COASTLINES: How MAPMAKERS FRAME THE
WORLD AND CHART ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 56 (2008).
164. See Janice Podsada, Lost Sea Cargo: Beach Bounty or Junk?, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC, June 19, 2001, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/06/
0619_seacargo.html.
165. MARC LEVINSON, THE Box: HOW THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE
WORLD SMALLER AND THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER 4 (2006).
166. Podsada, supra note 164.
167. Id.
168. CURTIS EBBESMEYER & ERIC SCIGLIANO, FLOTSAMETRICS AND THE
FLOATING WORLD: How ONE MAN'S OBSESSION WITH RUNAWAY SNEAKERS AND
RUBBER DUCKS REVOLUTIONIZED OCEAN SCIENCE 70-74 (2009).
169. Id. at 73.
170. Id.
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exchanges to match mismatched sneakers. In other words, a new
system of communicative activity arose amongst a group of people
who all engaged in the same beach activity: beachcombing.
Even if only the big container spills attract the media's attention,
the ocean can still offer smaller rewards to those who walk the beach
regularly. For instance, the waters off my beaches have an active
lobster fishery. Because lobstermen seem to be very good at losing
lobster pots with their attached ropes and buoys during storms, the
beachcomber frequently finds the lobstermen's wave pummeled gear
along the shore, especially in winter. Consequently, I have an ample
(and I like to believe admirable) supply of rope for any project I
might choose to undertake or for any fanciful scheme my boys might
imagine. Evidently, Thoreau, like me, was a salvager of rope. In
Cape Cod he describes one of his finds:
We also saved, at the cost of wet feet only, a valuable cord
and buoy, part of a seine, with which the sea was playing,
for it seemed ungracious to refuse the least gift which so
great a personage offered you. We brought this home and
still use it for a garden line.17 2
Clearly Thoreau's satisfaction in scavenging the rope is not just
with the money saved, but also in the fun of discovery and finding.
Indeed, the beach has long been a thoroughfare to discovery and
collecting. Stephen Kellert, who is one of the leading scholars
working in the area of sociobiology, has argued that beach
exploration is an ancient and unusually fulfilling activity:
Vast numbers of Americans engage in walking and
exploring beaches, shores and wetlands. The mental and
physical benefits associated with heightened awareness and
contact with the coast may be among the most ancient
outdoor recreational activities known.
The naturalist appeal of the coast is probably due to the
abundant opportunities this environment provides for
171. Id. at 73-74.
172. THOREAU, supra note 8, at 117.
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exploration and discovery. . . . The coastal environment is
an unrivaled habitat for exploring, discovering and
engaging feelings of wonder and mystery, in an almost
childlike manner independent of age.173
While we may not know how many centuries humans have wandered
and explored the shoreline for pleasure, historians have documented
that at least since the early nineteenth century, collecting marine
plants and animals from the tidal zone has been a popular hobby in
the United States. Books and magazine articles were written
explaining how to wander the shore and seek out, identify, and bring
home marine specimens. 174 One can imagine early nineteenth century
amateur naturalists, many of whom were women, walking up and
down the beach with an array of bottles for collecting in search of
new specimens, which would certainly been a topic of conversation.
These days perhaps collecting for most people is purely an
impulsive event that occurs when the ocean has left something
interesting in one's path. They also might not walk along the beach to
get anywhere in particular or to gather anything by design; they
simply enjoy walking the coastal margin.176 Even though the beach is
173. Stephen R. Kellert, Coastal Values and a Sense of Place, in AMERICA'S
CHANGING COASTS: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC TRUST 12, 17 (Diana M.
Whitelaw & Gerald R. Visgilio eds., 2005).
174. STILGOE, supra note 158, at 302.
175. Id. at 305-08.
176. This appears to have been the case in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987), where the public used the beach as a thoroughfare between two
public beach parks. Because the public travelled along this shoreline thoroughfare,
and because the boundary between the Nollan's purely private property and the
shoreline below the mean high tide line was inescapably ambiguous, the California
Coastal Commission sought an access easement across a portion of the Nollan's
property that would not always be subject to the public trust. Id. at 827-28. For a
discussion of the ambiguity of the property boundary between the Nollan's purely
private property and the public trust property and how using the beach as a
thoroughfare created conflicts between the public and the Nollans, see Robert
Thompson, Cultural Models and Shoreline Social Conflict, 35 COASTAL MGMT.
211, 216-18 (2007) [hereinafter Thompson, Cultural Models]. For a more
generalized discussion of the ambiguity of shoreline property lines and the reliance
on social norms rather than property rules, see Robert Thompson, Beach Access,
Trespass, and the Social Enactment of Property, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
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less of a traditional thoroughfare for these strollers or runners, the
beach is still a place for communicative activity. Vacationers stroll
down the beach chatting and local residents stop to talk with
neighbors and friends who they meet along the way.
People, however, often walk along the beach not only for pleasure,
but because it can still be the fastest, safest, and most pleasant route
from point A to point B. In beach communities, the streets can be
narrow, circuitous, busy, and without sidewalks. Thus, for example,
in Rhode Island, residents of the summer cottages at Carpenter's
Beach and the members of the Willows private beach club can
form a steady stream of strollers on a nice day as they head down to
the Vanilla Bean for ice cream or to the Ocean Mist or Murphy's
Family Pub for a drink or a meal.
6. Examples of Specific Debates on the Beach
Not long ago, I have become aware of a particular example of
people exercising their rights to speech and association on one of my
local beaches. My family adopted a rescue dog and I soon discovered
that most dog owners talk to each other while walking their dogs on
the beach. Frequently, friendly chats with other dog owners drift into
discussions concerning the town or state's dog management policies,
particularly as the date for banishing dogs from that beach
approaches. The banishment is in anticipation of tourist season.
These beach management discussions are wholly political in nature.
As the date approaches, the casual conversation about one another's
dogs and favorite dog walks shifts to the unfair treatment dog owners
and their pets. 17 Several people who I have met casually while
351 (2012), and Robert Thompson, Property Theory and Owning the Sandy Shore:
No Firm Ground to Stand On, 11 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 47 (2006).
177. For a full description of Carpenter's Beach, see Robert Thompson,
Affordable Twenty-Four Hour Access: Can We Save a Working Stiff's Place in
Paradise, 12 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 91 (2007).
178. A Google search for "beach dog bans" will quickly demonstrate that
summertime beach banishments for dogs are not uncommon and are frequently
unpopular among dog owners. For an example from North Carolina, see Rob
Morris, Southern Shores Decline to Ease Summer Dog Ban, THE OUTER BANKS
VOICE (Mar. 1, 2011), http://outerbanksvoice.com/2011/03/01/southern-shores-
declines-to-ease-summer-dog-ban. For an example from Georgia, see Orlando
Montoya, Georgia Beach Bans Dogs On Summer Days, GBP NEWS (May 26,
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walking my dog on the beach have tried to recruit me into a group
that is lobbying for summer time access to the beach. I, however,
have exercised my right to free association and declined the
invitation. In fact, I have also engaged in lively debate with other dog
owners when I have opined that the summer time banishment is
justified because too many of our fellow dog owners do not pick up
their dog's droppings. Some discussions in which I have expressed
this opinion have terminated with the other dog lovers exercising
their right to disassociate themselves from me. My dog, though, has
no such right, so the two of us, firm in my convictions, continue
happily down the beach.
Debates between user groups are not limited to the proper time and
place for walking dogs. Surfers and fishermen provide another
example of a resource conflict that gets debated on the beach. For
example, in some places, such as Montauk on New York's Long
Island, the surfers-like the dogs-have simply been banished for
certain months of the year, suggesting that the fishermen have greater
political clout. The sign of the fishermen's victory is the sign on
beach communicating to Montauk surfers that they cannot be surfers
at this particular surf break from March 31st until December 16th.179
7. Signs as Speech
Signs on or along the beach, like the one aimed at would be
surfers, are not uncommon. One can find an assortment of signs
either on the beach or positioned to be viewed from the beach that are
intended to communicate with people walking along the beach,
providing further evidence that beaches are often forums for public
speech. One sees a variety of "private beach" signs. For instance
signs can announce that the beach above the mean high tide line is
private-not that anyone knows where that boundary line really is.'so
2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.gpb.org/news/2012/05/25/georgia-beach-bans-dogs-
on-summer-days. For an example from California, see Ronald Dam, Dog Beach
Ban Not So Popular, GBP NEWS (Aug. 12, 2012, 3:28 AM), http://
palosverdes.patch.com/groups/politics-and-elections/p/dog-beach-ban-not-so-
popular.
179. James Kindall, Surf's Still Up, Legally, for Montauk Wave Riders, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/
nyregion/long-island/29surfli.html?_ r0.
180. See generally State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728 (R.I. 1982).
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One sees signs that ask people to stay off of the sand dunes, which
might be a legitimate effort to protect a fragile ecosystem or just
another attempt to assert private ownership.181 One also sees "for
sale" signs, which are an invitation to purchase and defend your own
stretch of beach. One last example from the Northeast are signs put
up seasonally by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service prohibiting
humans (with or without dogs) from walking on portions of the beach
when the nesting least terns and snowy plovers use these areas for
nesting and feeding.
Before moving onto the next section, it is worth emphasizing how
these policy debates (whether dogs should be on the beach, whether
we should close off parts of the beach to protect endangered species,
whether surfers and surfcasters should control a space, or who owns
the beach) help us to see how the beach should properly be
considered a public forum. The court in Wolin v. Port of N. Y Auth.
considered how "[t]he propriety of a place for use as a public forum
[] turn[s] on the relevance of the premises to the protest ... .182 As
the Wolin court explained, "this relation may be found in two ways.
In some situations the place represents the object of protest, the seat
of authority against which the protest is directed. In other situations,
the place is where the relevant audience may be found."l 83 The beach
is a particularly appropriate place to reach an audience that would be
particularly interested in speech dealing with beach use,
management, access, and ownership.
181. For a discussion of how the communicative intent of private beach signs can
range from threats to polite requests for civility, see Thompson, Cultural Models,
supra note 176.
182. Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 1968).
183. Id. (citations omitted). In Wolin, the plaintiff was attempting to hand out
anti-war literature at a bus terminal. The court found that was a proper place to try
to reach a particularly relevant public:
Here, the plaintiff is attempting to communicate his antiwar protest to the
general public and to a special audience-servicemen traveling to and
from their bases, particularly buses arriving from Fort Dix. The public is
there, more than 200,000 persons a day, and it is likely that the concourse
areas are more appropriate for the proposed activity than a narrow
sidewalk. And servicemen on leave are in the Terminal also in great
numbers.
Id. at 90-91.
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8. Do Ordinances Restricting On-Street Parking Exclude
Nonresidents from the Beach?
Even if one accepts that beaches are traditional public forums, the
parking restrictions that have been discussed in this article do not
explicitly prohibit anyone from accessing the beach; one simply
cannot park next to the public access point and then walk to the
traditional public forum along public roads and right-of-ways. In fact,
if an ordinance banning on-street parking is going to achieve its
objectives (i.e., eliminating the negative externalities that beachgoers
impose on the neighborhood), then the geographic extent of the ban
must apply to all streets that are within walking distance of the access
point. Thus, for example, shoreline anglers in Rhode Island have
increasingly made the argument that the parking bans result in an
actual loss of coastal access. 184 According to Bob Moeller, chairman
of the Rhode Island Saltwater Anglers Association's public access
committee:
[Fishermen in Rhode Island] still have a huge problem with
lack of public parking at most ROWs [public rights-of-
way]. No-parking signs on streets adjacent to ROWs are
put up by the cities and towns at the request of a few
agitated neighbors. The end result is the loss of public
access to the shoreline for the majority of Rhode Islanders.
This has to change so the public can fish, use and enjoy the
400 miles of public shoreline that our state offers.18 5
Still, is an ordinance unconstitutional if it is designed to keep
people from parking near a public access point and, in doing so,
keeps people from accessing a traditional public forum? We can
begin answering this question by recognizing that the ordinance does
not make the shoreline inaccessible to all people. The beach is still
accessible to the class of people who are fortunate enough to live
within walking distance of the access point or who rent a house or
room within walking distance of it. The court in Florida State
184. Tom Meade, Greater Awareness of Public Access Helps Anglers,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL. (Apr. 30, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 7504090.
185. Id.
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Conference of NAACP Branches v. City of Daytona Beach186
recognized that this type of ordinance creates two classes of people:
one class of people who can easily exercise their First Amendment
rights and a second class of people who will have a much more
difficult time exercising those same rights.' In Florida State
Conference of NAACP Branches, the court struck down a traffic
management plan that gave greater access to the beach to certain
individuals than others.188
The beach in Daytona Beach, Florida, is on the ocean facing side
of a barrier island. To reach the beach from the mainland where the
majority of the city's population is, drivers must cross one of six
bridges. By 1999, Daytona Beach had also become the location of an
annual event known as the Black College Reunion (BCR), which
started out as a reunion for two historically black colleges and which
grew to include 105 historically black colleges and universities.189 In
1999, the City intended to impose a Traffic Management Plan (TMP)
during BCR. The TMP called for the six bridges to be closed to
vehicle traffic during times of traffic congestion. The bridges,
however, would not be closed to individuals holding special passes
which were only available to Daytona Beach residents, business
owners and employees, and registered hotel guests. 190 All other
individuals were free to walk to the beaches, walk to a shuttle stop
and ride a shuttle to the beach, or wait for the bridges to reopen.191
The court acknowledged that Daytona had legitimate and
important concerns, but it also stressed that the plaintiffs who were
participating in the BCR had fundamental constitutional rights:
This case involves the difficult balance of competing
interests, such as public safety, traffic congestion, access to
homes, work, and facilities, and protection of property,
186. Fla. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. City of Daytona Beach, 54 F.
Supp. 2d 1283 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
187. Id. at 1287-29.
188. Id. at 1289.
189. Id. at 1284.
190. Id. at 1285.
191. Id. Daytona also admitted that it had no objective standard to determine
when the bridges would be either shut down or reopened. Id.
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with constitutional rights, such as freedom of association,
travel, and speech and equal protection of the laws.1 92
Despite the city's legitimate concerns, the court held that the TMP
unconstitutionally burdened the plaintiff's fundamental rights:
The right to assemble is protected by the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution. Restrictions of this right
are proper only when they relate to the time, place, or
manner of the assembly and "are narrowly tailored to serve
significant governmental interests and leave open ample
alternative channels of communication." Requiring a
residence, business ownership, rental of a hotel room in a
beach community, or a job in order to be given priority in
the right to assemble denies individuals "an equal
opportunity to be heard" and to assemble. The right to
assemble is "available to all, not merely to those who can
pay their own way."1 93
Quite importantly, the court's conclusion was not altered by the fact
that those "who are physically able may walk from the mainland over
the bridges to the beach side" were free to do so.194
In Leydon, the Connecticut Supreme Court similarly found that the
town ordinance unconstitutional because the ordinance made it
extremely difficult, though not impossible, for nonresidents to access
the beach. 195 The Town of Greenwich ordinance limited access to
Greenwich Point, which was a beach park, to town residents and their
guests. 196 Although the ordinance did not absolutely ban anyone from
accessing the beach, which the Connecticut Supreme Court
determined to be a traditional public forum, the court held that
requiring a nonresident to be accompanied by a resident amounted to
virtually banning nonresidents:
192. Id. at 1286.
193. Id. at 1288 (citations omitted).
194. Id.
195. Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 573 (Conn. 2001).
196. Id. at 558.
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The ordinance bars all nonresidents who are
unaccompanied by a town resident from Greenwich Point,
a public beach park. Thus, any nonresident who is unable
to find a town resident to accompany him or her to
Greenwich Point cannot engage in any activity there,
including expressive and associational activity. Moreover,
it is reasonable to presume that, for many reasons, most
nonresidents who might wish to gain admission to
Greenwich Point will be unable to find a town resident
willing to serve as a host. Even if a nonresident can find a
town resident to accompany him or her to Greenwich Point,
the mere fact that he or she is required to do so places more
than an incidental burden on the nonresident's expressive
and associational rights. It, therefore, is inarguable that the
ordinance significantly limits the ability of nonresidents to
engage in constitutionally protected activities at Greenwich
Point. 197
The correlation between the availability of parking and the ability
to access the shoreline can in fact be measured. For example,
Thompson and Dalton conducted boat-based offset surveys on upper
Narragansett Bay on fifty-two randomly selected days in the
summers of 2006 and 2007.198 During each survey, every person
along the shoreline was accurately mapped and entered into a
geographic information system (GIS). 199 The researchers also
mapped shoreline access points and entered the number of legal
parking spots available at each access point into the GIS.200 The
researchers then computed a Spearman's rho correlation coefficient
to assess the relationship between the amount of legal parking
available at an access point and the number of people observed using
the shoreline adjacent to the access point.201 There was a very strong
positive correlation between the number of legal parking spaces and
202people using the shoreline. A similar analysis was used to measure
197. Id. at 566-67 n.22.
198. See Thompson & Dalton, supra note 7, at 384.
199. For a full discussion of the methodology, see id. at 384-85.
200. Id. at 389-91.
201. Id. at 390-91.
202. Id. at 389-91.
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the correlation between the number of access points and people using
the shoreline and between the population density of the surrounding
neighborhood and people using the shore. No correlation was found
between access and access points and access and population
density. 20 Clearly, people are accessing the shore when parking were
available and are accessing it in much lower numbers when parking
is not available.
Figure 1 shows the same relationship between parking and
204
shoreline access graphically rather than statistically. Figure 1 is a
map of the ocean shoreline in Washington County, Rhode Island. The
circles show where parking lots are available at public access
205points. The circles are proportionate symbols; in other words, if
one circle is twice as large as another circle, then that parking lot has
twice as many parking spaces. Even though the Rhode Island
Constitution provides that everyone has a right to access the entire
length of the State's shoreline,206 one can see that both the parking
lots and the parking spaces are clustered and that large stretches of
the coastline have no public parking. On the bar chart below the
Rhode Island coastline, the x-axis represents the same length of
shoreline. The y-axis shows the number of people for every ten
linear feet of shoreline.20 8 Each horizontal dashed line on the chart
203. Id. at 391.
204. In this map of the ocean shoreline of Washington County, Rhode Island, a
circle represents each parking lot and the size of the circle represents the number of
parking spaces in each lot. The number of people along each ten linear feet of
shoreline is represented by the bar chart. Each horizontal line is equal to five
people.
205. On-street parking is prohibited almost everywhere along the portion of
Rhode Island coast shown in this map. The state, the towns, or private parties own
the parking lots. All of the parking lots charge a fee.
206. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17.
207. The x-axis is actually on a somewhat smaller scale than the map of the
Rhode Island shoreline because it is a straight line while the shoreline is diagonal
and curved. Still, the graph and the shoreline line up well because the angle of the
shoreline is rather consistent.
208. The number of people along the beach is based upon aerial photographs that
were taken on July 29, 2006, starting at 1:00 PM. The photographs were taken from
a single engine Skyhawk flying parallel to the shore at approximately 800 feet
altitude. The photographer shot overlapping frames and attempted to shoot as
perpendicular to the shore as possible. Two passes were made: one using a 50-
millimeter lens and one using an 85-millimeter lens. Oblique aerial photographs
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represents five people. One can see that wherever there is a
concentration of parking lots, many people are on the shoreline.
Wherever there are no parking lots, there are few or no people, even
though the entire shoreline is theoretically open to the public.
Figure 1. Parking and Shoreline Access along Rhode Island's
Southern Shore.209
Parking Spaces & People Using the Shoreline
Washington County, Rhode Island
Parking Spaces Rhode Island
-- - - - -- - - - - ---- ---- -- - - - -h om p s m r , I -Each bar represenits pecipe per 'C0 hInear feet ofshore
Each horizontailline equals he people
were used because the researchers wanted to be able to count people under beach
umbrellas. The researchers used one to 5,000 scale ortho-photographs to position
each aerial photograph along the correct length of shoreline. Because the aerial
photographs were oblique, geo-referencing them distorted the images. Typically,
only the center of the photograph was used, which is the least distorted. Moreover,
the researchers were interested in the intensity of access along the shoreline and not
density of use across the beach; therefore, the distortions were not significant for
the purposes of this study. After the aerial photographs were geo-referenced in a
geographic information system (ESRI ArcGIS), each person on the beach was
digitized. Thus, a geo-database was created within which each person was a
separate record with geographic coordinates. Another geo-database was created
within which each ten feet of linear shoreline was a separate record containing four
coordinates to form a polygon that had a width of ten feet and a height that covered
the beach. Then a program was written to count each digitized person within each
polygon.
209. Figure 1 created by and on file with author.
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9. Should On-Street Parking Bans Surrounding Public Access
Points Survive a Constitutional Challenge?
Whether a specific local ordinance banning on-street parking near
public shoreline access points is unconstitutional will depend on the
facts surrounding the adoption of that particular ordinance, the
reasons that local officials used to support their exercise of the police
power, the character of the constitutional challenge, and, hence, the
level of scrutiny that a court would apply.
Even though such ordinances banning parking are aimed at
nonresidents, challenges based upon the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment seem unlikely to prevail. The Equal
Protection Clause requires that "all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike." 210 If the ordinance bans all street parking, then
it does treat everyone the same. But even if the ordinance allows
residents to park while banning nonresidents, the Arlington court
upheld this type of preferential treatment of residents stating, "[t]he
Equal Protection Clause requires only that the distinction drawn by
an ordinance like Arlington's rationally promote the regulation's
objectives." 2 11
Because the objectives were proper and the parking restrictions
promoted those objectives, the differential treatment was
constitutional. Thus, parking restrictions near public access points
should probably survive an equal protection challenge if they are
"rationally related to a legitimate state interest."212 Certainly many
beachfront neighborhoods could have problems with visitors to the
beach being loud, leaving trash, or even urinating in the bushes; and
certainly the state has an interest in curbing these behaviors. Because
parking bans could help to alleviate these types of problems, they
probably do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
210. See Curse v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 843 F.2d 456, 463 (11th Cir. 1988).
211. County Bd. of Arlington County, Va. v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5, 7 (1977); see
also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); United States v. Lichenstein,
610 F.2d 1272, 1281 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that a party bringing an equal
protection claim must be similarly situated to a group receiving preferential
treatment). When government action "fails to treat classes alike, it may constitute a
violation of the equal protection clause." Curse, 843 F.2d at 463.
212. Fla. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. City of Daytona Beach 54 F.
Supp. 2d 1283, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
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Even though these types of parking bans would probably pass
constitutional muster under the Equal Protection Clause, the Free
Speech and Freedom of Assembly protections provided by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments would be reviewed under a more
demanding level of scrutiny. Because public beaches should be
considered public forums, the courts should not use the rationally
related standard when reviewing those facts and the local
government's reasoning for adopting the restrictive parking
ordinances.213 When deciding whether to apply strict scrutiny or
intermediate scrutiny, the court would initially determine whether the
ordinance distinguishes between prohibited and permitted speech on
the basis of content or whether the ordinance is content neutral.214 If
an ordinance imposes content-based restriction on speech in a public
forum, that ordinance is subject to strict scrutiny and the government
must show that the ordinance is necessary to serve a compelling state
215interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. However,
if the ordinance is content neutral, then intermediate scrutiny is
appropriate; therefore, the ordinance would only have to be
"narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest," and
"leave open ample alternative channels of communication." 216
Local governments should have a tough time arguing that the bans
are narrowly tailored time, place, and manner restrictions. While
beach users might cause problems in a neighborhood in which they
are parking and while the government could conceivably have a
significant interest in alleviating or eliminating these problems, one
has difficulty imagining how a complete ban on parking can be
conceived of as "narrowly tailored." The narrowly tailored
requirement is demanding, particularly when entire behaviors are
banned.
213. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761
(1995) ("The right to use government property for one's private expression
depends upon whether the property has by law or tradition been given the status of
a public forum . .. [if so] a state's right to limit protected expressive activity
[thereon] is sharply circumscribed . . . .") (citations omitted).
214. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481-82 (1988).
215. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
216. Id.
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A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no
more than the exact source of the "evil" it seeks to remedy.
A complete ban can be narrowly tailored, but only if each
activity within the proscription's scope is an appropriately
targeted evil. For example, in Taxpayers for Vincent we
upheld an ordinance that banned all signs on public
property because the interest supporting the regulation, an
esthetic interest in avoiding visual clutter and blight,
rendered each sign an evil. Complete prohibition was
necessary because "the substantive evil-visual blight-
[was] not merely a possible byproduct of the activity, but
[was] created by the medium of expression itself."2 17
In the case of bans on parking, parking itself is not the problem
about which people often complain, but instead the associated
externalities, such as noise, garbage, and public urination. All of
these problems could be controlled by less restrictive means than
complete bans on parking. For example, noise is more commonly a
problem in the evening hours and at night. Thus, a town could adopt
an ordinance restricting parking during the evening and at night,
which would be less restrictive. A town could also prohibit amplified
music. Installing trash receptacles could control littering. Public
urination could be taken care of by installing restrooms, placing
portable toilets at the access point, or at least posting a sign
informing the public where the next, reasonably close public facility
can be found. These management efforts could be paid for in part or
full through parking fees. Furthermore, if the problem is inadequate
parking for everyone who wants to use the access point, the town can
place time limits on parking.
III. CONCLUSION
Many Americans highly value access to the ocean shore. As has
been demonstrated in this article, Americans go to their beaches to
engage in many activities, including ones that demonstrate that
beaches can be public forums. Inarguably, beaches are places where
people have long assembled. However, beaches have also become
217. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485-86 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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contentious places where property owners on or near the shore have
worked to restrict access to the shore through their neighborhoods.
Not infrequently, local government has responded to the complaints
of these property owners by establishing parking restrictions around
public access points.
While some might belittle the importance of our beaches, they are
deeply loved public spaces that are every bit as important to us as our
city parks. Thus, the public's ability to access public beaches must be
as diligently protected as access to our other quintessential public
forums: city parks and thoroughfares. Because parking bans near
access points are not narrowly tailored and because they place a
substantial burden on the public's ability to access a traditional public
forum and to exercise the right to assemble there, these bans are
susceptible to constitutional challenges under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. If a court finds a parking ban to be
unconstitutional, the local community still has other management
tools available to deal with such significant concerns as garbage,
noise, and limited available parking. Well thought out and well
crafted management plans are surely preferable to the loss of public
access to the shore and to fundamental rights.
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